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Abstract 
In Woodward’s causal model of explanation, explanatory information is information that is 
relevant to manipulation and control and that affords to change the value of some target 
explanandum variable by intervening on some other. Accordingly, the depth of an explanation 
is evaluated through the size of the domain of invariance of the generalization involved. 
In this paper, I argue that Woodward’s treatment of explanatory relevance in terms of 
invariant causal relations is still wanting and suggest to evaluate the depth of an explanation 
through the size of the domain of circumstances that it designates as leaving the explanandum 
unchanged. 
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Relevance, not Invariance, Explanatoriness, not Manipulability: 
Discussion of Woodward on Explanatory Relevance. 
  
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The question of explanatory relevance has been for long a challenge for theorists of 
explanation. It is well-known for example that Hempel’s DN model, Salmon’s SR model or 
Salmon’s causal models fail to characterize philosophically what type of information is 
relevant to the explanation of some fact F and should therefore figure in its explanation. 
In the last two decades, James Woodward has developed a manipulationist model of 
explanation, which seems to fare better than its predecessors about explanatory relevance, if 
not to solve the issue, and that accounts for many of the usual tricky cases. In this model, 
explanatory information is information that is relevant to manipulation or control and that 
affords to change the value of some target explanandum variable by intervening on some 
other. Accordingly, the depth of an explanation is evaluated through the size of the domain of 
invariance of the generalization involved. 
In this paper, I argue that Woodward’s treatment of relevance in terms of invariant causal 
relations is still subtly but unavoidably wanting because it forces one to include within the 
explanation of a fact F much information that may be relevant to account for other facts of a 
same physical type but may be irrelevant to F. I further suggest to evaluate the depth of an 
explanation through the size of the domain of circumstances it describes as leaving the 
explanandum phenomenon unchanged. 
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In section 2, I briefly present Woodward’s account of explanation and his notion of 
explanatory depth. I develop at length in section 3 a test case example dealing with the 
explanation of the law of Areas and describe two ways to explain this physical regularity. I 
show in section 4 that, whereas the first explanation includes clearly irrelevant facts, 
according to Woodward’s account, it cannot be said to be less explanatory than the second. I 
further analyze why satisfying the manipulability requirement may imply to include irrelevant 
facts in explanations in order to make them deeper (in Woodward’s sense). I further describe 
in section 5 a new criterion for judging explanatory depth and argue that this criterion and 
Woodward’s criterion are incompatible. I finally emphasize in section 6 that manipulability is 
still a virtue, even if not an essential virtue of explanations and that, depending on the 
circumstances, one may be interested in developing explanations that are less explanatory 
(because they contain irrelevant facts) but that afford to control physical systems.  
 
2. Woodward’s manipulationist account of explanation 
It may seem weird to challenge Woodward (and Hitchcock) on the question of explanatory 
relevance for they have themselves showed much acumen in diagnosing where existing 
accounts fail and offered new answers to the problem. Indeed, in his 1995 article, Hitchcock 
elegantly shows that the problem of explanatory relevance is still a worry for Salmon’s causal 
model because identifying all the intermingled spatio-temporal causal processes running in 
some physical circumstances falls short of indicating why exactly some phenomenon takes 
place in these circumstances. As Woodward further notes, even if the right causal processes 
are identified, “features of a process P in virtue of which it qualifies as a causal process 
(ability to transmit mark M) may not be the features of P that are causally or explanatorily 
relevant to the outcome E that we want to explain” (Woodward, 2003, 353). 
In this context, it comes as no surprise that Woodward tries to answer the above worries by 
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means of his causal model. Doing justice to all aspects of Woodward’s rich treatment of 
explanatory relevance and explanation would take much longer than can be done within this 
short paper. The next paragraphs are therefore merely devoted to reminding the reader some 
important aspects of Woodward’s account so that what it amounts to when it comes to the 
analysis of the coming example appears clearly. 
For Woodward, “explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactual 
dependence” (2003, 191). Explanatory generalization used in an explanation must indicate 
that the explanandum was to be expected and how it would change, were some changes made 
in the circumstances that obtained; said differently, good explanations “are such that they can 
be used to answer a range of counterfactual questions about the conditions under which their 
explananda would have been different” (ibidem). 
In this perspective, “explanatory relevant information is information that is potentially 
relevant to manipulation and control” (2003, 10). In other words, something is relevant 
information if it essentially figures in an explanation describing how the explanandum was to 
happen and how it would change, were the properties described in the explanans modified. 
This requirement also discards irrelevant circumstances through the identification of 
irrelevant variables: “an explanans variable S is explanatorily irrelevant to the value of an 
explanandum variable M if M would have this value for any value of S produced by an 
intervention” (2003, 200). 
Woodward further defines the notion of invariance of a generalization. A generalization can 
be stable under many changes of conditions not mentioned in it. For example, Coulomb’s law 
holds under changes in the weather. By contrast, a generalization that “continues to hold or is 
stable in this way under some class of interventions that change the conditions described in its 
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antecedent and that tells us how the conditions described in its consequent would change in 
response to these interventions is invariant under such interventions” (1997, S.31)1.  
It is then clear that invariance is a gradual notion because a generalization can hold under 
more or less interventions. Accordingly, depending on the degree of invariance of the 
generalization they rely upon, explanations provide patterns for answering more or less what-
if explanatory requests about these counterfactual circumstances and therefore for controlling 
the corresponding systems. 
Woodward further claims that the concept of invariance provides a means for evaluating the 
goodness of explanations – what he calls “explanatory depth”: “We can thus make 
comparative judgments about the size of domains of invariance and this is all that is required 
to motivate comparative judgments of explanatory depth of the sort we have been making” 
(1997, S.39). To put things briefly, the more invariant, the more explanatory, or to use 
Woodward’s own words: “generalizations that are invariant under a larger and more 
important set of changes often can be used to provide better explanations and are valued in 
science for just this reason” (2003, 257). 
At this step, my claim can be precisely formulated: even if they are valued in science, more 
invariant explanations are not always more explanatory because the request for invariance 
may run contrary to the fundamental request for relevance that explanations should primarily 
satisfy. 
 
3. The law of Areas and its explanations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  More precisely, invariance is defined by means of the notion of “testing intervention”. See 
(2003, 250) for more details.	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The test case I now want to investigate is the explanation of the law of Areas (also called 
"Kepler's second law"), which states that, “for planets in our solar system, a line joining a 
planet and the sun sweeps out equal areas during equal intervals of time". I shall describe two 
explanations of it and compare them with respects to invariance and relevance. 
 As we shall see, the first explanation (hereafter explanation 1) relies upon the general 
angular momentum theorem. Let us go deeper into it. Let us assume a Galilean reference 
frame, a fixed axis M’ with position given by vector r’ and a moving material point with 
position given by vector r, having mass m and momentum p (bold characters denote vectors). 
The angular momentum of M about M’ is defined by: Lr’ = (r’-r) × p = m (r’-r) × v, where 
the symbol “×” stands for the usual external product. Let F denotes the sum of forces applied 
to M. The momentum of F about axis M’ or torque is defined as µF/M’ = (r’-r) × F. Then, 
deriving the angular momentum yields  
 
€ 
dLr'
dt =
d((r − r') × p)
dt = (r − r ') ×
dp
dt +
d(r − r')
dt × p  
Because the momentum p is collinear to the speed of M, the second term in the right-hand 
part of the equation is null. So far no physics has been used. Newton’s second law says that 
dp/dt = d(mv) / dt= ma = F. So finally, one gets  
(1) 
€ 
dLr'
dt = (r − r') × F = µF /M'  
For a collection of particles, one can also define the total torque µ=Σ µi, which is the sum of 
the torques on each particle, as well as the total angular momentum L, which is the sum of 
momentum of each particle and one gets  
(1.5) µ=Σ µi = dL/dt. 
The total torque is the sum of the momentum of all forces, internal and external. But, because 
of Newton’s law of action and reaction, the torques on two reacting objects compensate and 
therefore, the internal torques balance out pair by pair. In conclusion, “the rate of change of 
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the total angular momentum about any axis is equal to the external torque about that axis”. 
This is the general angular momentum theorem, which is true for any collection of objects, 
whether they form a rigid body or not. 
If one wants to explain the law of Areas, one should finally note that, in the case of the 
Earth/Sun two-body system, if vE denotes the speed of the Earth, rE its position, FG the 
gravitational force, LE the Earth momentum about the Sun, α the angle between rE and vE, 
and AE (t) the swept area in function of time, in virtue of the definition of the outer product, 
(2) 
€ 
LE
mE
=
rE × vE
mE
= rE . vE sin(α) = 2.
dAE (t)
dt . 
Because this relation holds for each mass point, the relation µ=Σ µi = dL/dt can now be seen 
as describing the variation of the variation of the sum of the areas swept by each point of a 
system about an axis, be it a rigid body or a set of independent mass points. 
In the case of the Earth-Sun system, it should further be noted that the momentum of the 
gravitational force FG about the Sun is zero (because the force and the vector r are collinear). 
Therefore, because of (1.5), the angular momentum of the Earth about the Sun is constant and 
because of (2), A(t) grows linearly with time, which demonstrates that the law of Areas 
obtains. 
This explanation perfectly fits Woodward’s account of explanation and one can repeat what 
he says about his paradigmatic case of the theoretical explanation in terms of Coulomb's law 
of the electrostatic relation E=λ/(2πε0r) (203,196-204). The explanation does exhibit the 
features emphasized by DN theorists: it is a deductively valid argument in terms of Newton’s 
second law and the description of the system (positions, speeds and masses of the points, 
forces). But in addition, it does exhibit a systematic pattern of counterfactual dependence, 
which can be summarized by combining (1.5) and (2) into the general relation (3) µ=Σ µi = 
dL/dt=2 Σ mi d/dt (dAi(t)/dt), which the law of Areas is a special case when the right variables 
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are assigned the right values (two bodies, one central gravitational force, etc.). The derivation 
describes how the explanandum law of Areas would change according to (3) and how it 
systematically depends on Newton’s second law, the forces and the particular conditions cited 
in the explanans. More specifically, the explanation makes clear how the total swept area 
would vary were the mass, speed, position of the Earth different, were additional forces at 
play but also were additional bodies included in the system. In short, (3) and the explanation 
including it also indicate how to answer a range of what-if questions about counterfactual 
circumstances in which the explanandum would have changed. Regarding the range of these 
questions and the invariance of the explanation, it is difficult to do better, because Newton’s 
law and (3) cover all situations in classical physics and therefore all classical changes that can 
be brought about to the two-body system case. 
   Let us now turn to the second explanation (hereafter explanation 2). In order to give the 
reader a clearer feeling of why it is better, I shall give two versions of it, one of which more 
pictorial. Let us start with the vectorial derivation. Because of relation (2), the law of Areas 
obtains if the intensity 
€ 
LE  of the angular momentum LE of the Earth about the Sun is 
constant. In virtue of relation (1), this happens when (r’-r) × dp/dt = 0, which is the case if 
dp/dt and (r’-r) are collinear. This is so because the only force at play is radial and the 
variation of momentum of a particle is along the direction of the force exerted upon it, that is 
dp/dt = α F, where α is real, not necessarily constant and not specified. Newton provides a 
more geometrical way to see the explanation: 
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Figure 1: Geometrical demonstration of the Law of Areas by Newton (1726/1972) 
 
The Earth’s trajectory goes through A, B, C, etc. and the law of Areas obtains if the area of 
SAB, SBC, etc. are numerically equal. The explanation of each trajectory step is decomposed 
in two parts. On the one hand, if no force was at play, in virtue of the inertia principle, the 
Earth would go straight from B to c in one time interval with AB=Bc. This implies that the 
area of SAB and SBc are numerically equal. On the other hand, if the Earth was motionless in 
B, because of the central gravitational force, it would go somewhere on (SB), say in V. By 
combining the two moves, the Earth finally goes to C, with BV=cC. Because (Cc) and (SB) 
are parallel, the area of SAC and SBc are also numerically equal. By combining the two 
equalities, one gets that that the area of SAB and SAC are numerically equal. The law of 
Areas finally obtains by taking smaller and smaller time intervals. The important point is that 
the numerical equality between the area of SBc and SBC obtains whatever the position of V 
on (SB): in other words, it obtains provided that the change of momentum due to a force is 
along the force direction, that is, provided dp/dt = α F. 
How good is this second explanation? First, it also exhibits the features emphasized by DN 
theorists: it is a deductively valid argument in which some nomological component is 
essentially needed (as well as the description of some particular circumstances). It shows in 
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addition that the whole content of Newton’s second law is not required within the 
explanation. More precisely, the quantitative part of Newton’s second law, which relates the 
values of forces and acceleration, can be removed for the premises without altering the 
validity of the argument. Better, from a physical point of view, this removal brings some 
important piece of explanatory information because it indicates more specifically what in the 
physics is essential for the law of Areas to obtain. The quantitative aspect of the momentum 
variation is shown to be explanatorily irrelevant, which indicates that the law of Areas does 
obtain for all worlds with a dynamical law such that the variation of momentum is along the 
force direction – and this is a piece of explanatory information that explanation 1 does not 
provide because it includes the described irrelevant information. 
Accordingly, explanation 2 is also instrumental to answer what-if questions about what 
would happen should the intensity of the force be different, time be discrete or the 
gravitational constant change with time. So, the corresponding explanatory generalization is 
also invariant under a large range of interventions.  
 
4. Comparison between the two explanations regarding depth and diagnosis about the 
inadequacy of Woodward’s account 
Let us now see how the two explanations comparatively fare according to Woodward’s 
criterion of explanatory depth. As just mentioned, both explanations are invariant under a 
large range of interventions. As we saw, Woodward suggests assessing explanatory depth by 
comparing domains of invariance. In the present case, none of the two explanations can then 
be said to be deeper than the other because none of the two sets is a subset of the other. 
Indeed, explanation 1 directly yields answers to what-if questions about how the total swept 
area quantitatively changes when, say, non radial forces are at play or more bodies involved, 
which explanation 2 does not (because it omits the quantitative part of Newton’s second law). 
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Conversely, explanation 2 explicitly indicates that the law of Areas would still obtain in 
circumstances in which Newton’s second law would be violated, which explanation 1 does 
not, because it designs as explanatory relevant the whole law with its quantitative aspect. 
Overall, from Woodward’s perspective, we have a situation with two good explanations 
which explanatory depth cannot be compared because their domains of invariance only partly 
overlap. And this is a case that is accommodated by Woodward when he notes that the 
comparison of the domains of invariance of explanations “obviously yields only a partial 
ordering” because “for many pairs of generalizations, neither will have a range of invariance 
that is a proper subset of the other” (2003, 262-64). 
My point is that this woodwardian conclusion is not satisfactory: if one focuses upon the 
relevance of the explanatory material regarding the explanandum, explanation 2 is better than 
explanatory 1. It is indeed commonly agreed that an explanation of A should merely include 
explanatory information that is relevant to the occurrence of A (at least if one’s epistemic goal 
is to provide an explanation of A that is as explanatory as possible (see section 6 for more 
comments about this restriction). As mentioned earlier, explanation 2 omits explanatory 
material that is irrelevant to the occurrence of the law of Areas, which explanation 1 does not. 
It is then no surprise that explanation 1 provides an answer to many what-if questions which 
answer depends on this irrelevant material and cannot therefore be given by explanation 1. 
However, while these additional answerable questions contribute to extend the invariance of 
explanation 1, the ability to answer them should not be seen as a sign of the greater goodness 
of explanation 1 (quite the contrary!) because, as the Newtonian investigation described 
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above shows, answering them requires some causal information that is here explanatorily 
irrelevant2. 
Let us now try to see more clearly why Woodward’s account leads to include irrelevant 
features in explanations to make them deeper. The reason seems to be that he requires that an 
explanation should account for many counterfactual cases that belong to a same physical type, 
defined in terms of the explanandum variable appearing in the explanatory generalization, and 
which the explanandum fact is an instantiation of. But this compels him to include in the 
explanatory material not only the facts that are explanatorily relevant to the target 
explanandum but also the facts that are explanatory relevant to all the values the explanandum 
variable may take. But as the example shows, the explanatorily relevant facts for the latter and 
the former need not coincide. The moral to draw is that facts belonging to an identical type do 
not always have the same explanations nor explanations of the same type. 
Here, it is important to note that the explanandum type that requires to draw this moral (the 
variation of the swept area) is not the product of some gerrymandering artificially associating 
pears and apples. So the moral should be rephrased more precisely and strongly like this: facts 
belonging to an identical bona fide physical type (corresponding to the explanandum variable 
of a genuine physical generality) do not always have the same set of explanatory relevant 
facts nor explanations of the same type.  
This conclusion has a counterpart in terms of whether domains of invariance are appropriate 
to assess the depth of an explanation and which what-if erotetic requests are appropriate for 
this task (to use a notion Woodward often relies upon). Requiring that an explanation of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Of course, these irrelevant features belong to a fundamental causal law, which is true in all 
models described by classical physics. But this does not imply that they should pop up in all 
our explanations of physical phenomena. 
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target explanandum fact F should allow one to answer what-if questions about counterfactual 
circumstances corresponding to the invariance domain of some general and functionally 
described regularity, which the explanandum case is an instance of, may imply to include in 
the explanatory material physical information that is relevant for these circumstances but not 
for F. Accordingly, even if these explanatory requests are by themselves scientifically 
legitimate, it may be illegitimate to judge the goodness or depth of an explanation of F by the 
ability it provides to answer these requests because the physical information necessary for this 
task may be explanatory irrelevant regarding F - and this information should therefore not be 
included in a good explanation E of F, which removes the possibility of answering these 
requests on the basis of E. In short, being a what-if question about some circumstances in the 
domain of invariance of the explanatory generalization that one uses in the explanation E is 
not a sufficient condition for being an appropriate question for testing the depth of E because 
this criterion is incompatible with a satisfactory treatment of the problem of relevance for 
explanations. 
The conclusion regarding the evaluation of explanatory depth in terms of domain of 
invariance comes naturally. It is not legitimate to evaluate the depth of an explanation by 
assessing the domain of invariance of the generalization used in it. Performing well on the 
invariance criterion leads to promote explanations of individual facts that are special cases of 
general explanatory patterns built on generalizations that are invariant on large domains… but 
it potentially also leads to violate the requirement of relevance for the explanations of these 
individual facts. 
 
5. Another criterion for explanatory depth 
Still, as can be inferred from the discussion of the example, it seems that a good explanation 
(which satisfies the criterion of explanatory relevance) does provide answers to many 
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appropriate what-if questions. Explanation 2 shows that the law of Areas would still obtain in 
many circumstances in which the quantitative part of Newton’s second law or the intensity of 
the gravitational law would be different. It thereby enables one to answer in the affirmative 
the corresponding “would-the-explanandum-still-be-the-case” (in short “would-still” 
questions). For a derivative explanation, this set of circumstances in which the explanandum 
is shown by an explanatory argument to be left unchanged corresponds to the set of situations 
in which the premises of the explanatory argument are true. Further, the more irrelevant 
information is removed from the premises, the weaker these explanatory premises and the 
wider the class of situations to which they apply. Let us call this class of situations the domain 
of strict invariance of the explanation (by contrasts with Woodward’s notion of domain of 
(large) invariance of the generalization employed in the explanation, hereafter “large 
invariance”). Then, the above discussion leads to the following suggestion:  
(S) The wider the domain of strict invariance of an explanation, the deeper the 
explanation. 
 It would take much more that can be said here to develop this suggestion into a fully-
fledged proposal about the nature of explanation. In particular, a critical comparison with 
notions discussed by Reichenbach or Salmon in different contexts such as the notions of 
broadest homogeneous reference class, maximal class of maximal specificity or 
exhaustiveness (Salmon, 1989, 69, 104, 193) would be helpful. Nevertheless, the following 
remarks are in order. First, (S) indicates how an explanation can be turned into a better one by 
expurgating its premises from irrelevant information; but it does not however indicates in 
general what type of information can be present in the premises for something to count as a 
potential explanation. Therefore, it should not be seen as something standing on its own 
(otherwise, the best explanation would be the self-explanation of one fact by itself). Second, 
the domain that is here described should be distinguished from the scope of the laws or the 
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domain of invariance of the generalization present in the premises, which characterize 
statements: strict invariance characterizes the explanation itself.  Alternatively it can be seen 
as the domain of the explanatory generalization saying that when the premises hold (in this or 
different worlds), so does the explanandum. Third, just as for Woodward’s account, this 
criterion is likely to describe only a partial order over explanations. Finally, it should be noted 
that the criteria of having a large domain of large invariance and of having a large domain of 
strict invariance go into two opposite directions. Indeed, explanations with large domains of 
general invariance require generalization with much physical information packed in it; 
whereas explanations with large domains of strict invariance require premises with as little 
physical information as possible in their premises. So it does not seem possible to try to 
conciliate both criteria about the nature of explanatory depth. 
 
6. Concluding remarks: generality and manipulability versus specificity and relevance 
or the contextual choice of epistemic virtues in scientific practice 
I have criticized in this article the use of the size of the domains of invariance of the 
generalizations used in explanation to describe the depth of these explanations. I have argued 
that this characterization of the goodness of explanations fares badly by the requirement of 
relevance, which explanatory explanations should primarily satisfy. To describe the goodness 
of explanations I have proposed a different criterion based on the notion of strict invariance 
and the ability to answer “would-still” questions offered by explanations. And I have 
emphasized that satisfying one criterion may run contra the satisfaction of the other.  
One final word of caution is needed here. The above analysis dealt with the explanatory 
character of explanations of specific individual facts, which relevance is a clear component 
of. Now, like all other things, explanations may also have unspecific additional virtues, which 
may be philosophically unessential to them but practically crucial to their use. In the present 
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case, having a wide large invariance is no doubt such an unessential virtue. Indeed, an 
explanation with wide large invariance, even if it is of average quality regarding explanatory 
relevance, does provide a functional pattern for a family of similar explanations: it offers the 
opportunity to explain many similar phenomena with the same pattern of reasoning, which 
yields some significant economy of scientific and cognitive means. As any versatile tool, 
because it is general, such an explanation may prove useful, even if it is not optimal for 
specific explanatory tasks. Finding such explanations is therefore a scientifically legitimate 
(and difficult) task. 
So should scientists favor in practice specific relevant explanations with wide domains of 
strict invariance over general explanations with wide domains of large invariance? I think 
there is no general answer to this question. Pace the philosophical interest for essential 
epistemic virtues, contextual interests are to prevail depending on what scientific needs are. 
Suppose that you are interested in controlling optical rays within optical fibers or the 
trajectory of a car in various circumstances; then there is little doubt that you will be 
interested in finding explanations with wide domains of large invariance so that you can 
determine how the rays or the cars will behave in a wide range of circumstances with one 
single functional relation and control them by adopting the external forcing. For some of these 
covered circumstances, it is likely that this single functional relation will contain unnecessary 
(irrelevant) information and for some specific cases you may even be using a sledgehammer 
to crack a nut; but why should you care? For control purposes, it may be more convenient to 
use one single relation covering all cases than a cumbersome wealth of them, each 
specifically targeted at some subset of circumstances. 
 Suppose now that you are interested is observing a green flash effect (some optical 
phenomena occurring after sunset or before sunrise, when a green spot is visible above the 
sun). Then, what you want to learn about the circumstances in which you stand a good choice 
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to observe a green flash effect and you want to know a set of circumstances that is as large as 
possible. Therefore, knowing which circumstances will not alter the phenomenon (because 
they are irrelevant to the mechanism involved) is crucial. In this case, you will be interested in 
discarding from the explanation any irrelevant information that restricts your knowledge of 
this set, even if it comes at the price of leaving out of the explanans physical information that 
may be useful to answer questions about what would happen in close circumstances (in which 
no green flash effect is observed). So you may end up with an explanation that is not useful 
for manipulationist purposes because it is specifically targeted at the green flash effect; 
perhaps this explanation will not even have a functional form (like above the explanation 2 of 
the law of Areas); but, because its explanans only describes the physical facts that are crucial 
for the green flash effect to happen and discards the other, it will be more explanatory and 
therefore more informative about the whole range of circumstances in which the observation 
can be made.  
In conclusion, Woodward’s criterion for explanatory depth seems more appropriate to 
characterize explanations that are useful for control than the ones that are deeply explanatory. 
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